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INTRODUCTION
The optimal way to organize long-term relationships is, if feasible, to write long-term contracts to which all parties are committed. Commitment prevents these parties from behaving opportunistically ex post and thus promotes efficient conduct ex ante. Yet full commitment is an idealized case. The corresponding optimal contracts are generally not sequentially optimal or renegotiation-proof. That is, in the process of implementing a long-term contract, all parties may be better off modifying the initial contract (while this renegotiation is ex post mutually beneficial, the parties would ex ante like to be able to commit not to renegotiate). The commitment modelling so common in economic theory at best describes an extreme case in which the physical costs of recontracting are important or in which one of the parties can develop a reputation for refraining from signing mutually advantageous contracts. This paper investigates the implications of renegotiation in an adverse selection model.1 Section 2 sets up a simple two-period model of procurement (as discussed below, the model admits alternative interpretations, such as two-period monopoly price or quality discrimination). In each period, the agent realizes a project for the principal. The project's cost in that period depends on a time-invariant adverse selection parameter or type (the agent's ability or the state of technology) and on a cost-reducing effort. The only commonly observable variable is the realized cost in the period. In a static (one-period) framework, 1. See Fudenberg-Tirole (1988) for a study of renegotiation in a moral-hazard framework, and Hart and Moore (1988) , Laffont (1987)(1988) for the case of symmetric but nonverifiable information. These papers as well as the present work use a principal-agent framework (i.e. concern renegotiation in contract theory). For the study of non-contractual renegotiation in game-theoretic contexts see in particular Pearce (1987) and Farrell and Maskin (1987) . 597 the optimal incentive scheme for the principal trades off the two conflicting concerns of extracting the agent's informational rent and giving the latter appropriate incentives to reduce cost, and specifies a reward that decreases with realized cost. With two types (the case considered in most of this paper), the incentive constraint is binding "upwards"
only. The issue is to induce the good (efficient) type not to mimic the bad (inefficient) type. For the optimal incentive scheme under asymmetric information, the good type produces at his socially optimal cost while the bad type's cost exceeds his socially optimal cost in order to reduce the good type's rent.
In the twice-repeated relationship, the principal would optimally commit to repeat twice the optimal static scheme. That is, he ought to commit not to alter the first-period incentive scheme in the second period. However, this optimal commitment incentive scheme is not renegotiation proof (Dewatripont (1986) ). For, suppose that the agent has produced at the high cost in the first period, demonstrating that he has low ability or that the technology is unfavourable. While the initial contract induces the same inefficiently high cost in the second period, it has become common knowledge that this contract can be renegotiated to benefit both parties by giving more incentives to the agent.
But this renegotiation with the bad type towards higher incentives raises the rent of the good type, if the latter masquerades as a bad type in the first period. It thus makes the good type's incentive compatibility constraint in the first period harder to satisfy.
In Laffont-Tirole (1987 we investigated a two-period model of a principal-agent relationship run by short-term contracts. That is, we assumed that the principal can only commit to one-period incentive schemes.2 In the second period the principal selects his preferred contract conditional on the information learned in the first period. Such short-term contracts are trivially renegotiation-proof. A main focus of this analysis was the ratchet effect: the fact that the agent is concerned about the expropriation of his informational rent in the second period makes separation of types costly, and even infeasible in the case of a continuum of types. The intuition for this latter result is that, given that no rent is left for period two if the agent reveals his type in period one, disguising slightly his type in period one has no first-order effect (from the envelope theorem) but yields a first-order gain in rent for period two.
The analysis of short-term contracting is complex because a bad type may adopt the "take-the-money-and-run" strategy: to induce a good type to reveal some information in the first period, the first-period contract must offer him a nice deal, which may make it optimal for a bad type to mimic a good type in the first period and quit the relationship in the second period. Thus the first-period incentive constraints may be binding upwards and downwards.
In this paper we make an assumption about commitment abilities of the parties intermediate between full intertemporal commitment and no intertemporal commitment, which we refer to as "commitment and renegotiation". We allow commitment in that the two parties sign a long-term contract that is enforced if any of the parties wants it to be enforced. However nothing prevents the parties from agreeing to alter the initial contract.
While the optimal contract can w.l.o.g. be designed so as not to be renegotiated in the second period, the renegotiation-proofness (RP) requirement restricts the set of allowable second-period contracts. The analysis shares with the commitment case the simplicity associated with the incentive constraint being binding upwards only, and yet exhibits a form of ratcheting similar to that of the no-commitment case. The ability to commit 2. See Freixas et al. (1985) for an earlier game-theoretic approach to the ratchet effect (which restricted attention to linear incentive schemes), and Baron-Besanko (1987) for a different notion of no-commitment (in which the principal is constrained to be "fair" to the agent in period two).
eliminates the possibility of the take-the-money-and-run strategy by making all payments conditional on the firm's participation in period two. Section 3 demonstrates that there are three kinds of renegotiation-proof contracts. In all kinds, the good type produces at his socially optimal cost level. In the first kind, the second-period allocation is that of a "sell-out" or "fixed-price" contract; that is, the agent, whatever his type, behaves as if he were residual claimant for his cost savings and produces at his (type-contingent) socially optimal cost. The second kind is the "conditionally optimal contract." That is, the agent faces the same incentive contract he would face if the principal were not bound by a previous contract and offered the optimal static contract given his posterior beliefs about the agent's type. The third kind is the intermediate class of "rent-constrained contracts", in which the bad agent produces at a cost that lies between his socially optimal cost and his cost in the optimal static contract given the principal's posterior beliefs (the conditionally optimal contract is thus an extreme rentconstrained contract). The principal would like to increase the bad type's cost to reduce the good type's rent, but is unable to do so because of the rent level he previously offered the good type.
Section 4 characterizes the optimal intertemporal contract. The second-period contract is conditionally optimal (i.e. is of the second kind). In the first period, only the good type's incentive compatibility constraint is binding (as in the unrenegotiated contract case, but unlike the no-commitment case). The good type is indifferent between revealing his type and masquerading as a bad type. The description of the optimal contracts is therefore rather simple. Incentive constraints are binding as usual and the contracts offered in period two are conditionally optimal, i.e. are not distorted by the principal's ability to commit to rents. However, none of these results is obvious. Limits on commitment might, as in Laffont-Tirole (1987) , lead to incentive constraints binding in both directions. And the ability to commit to rents to mitigate the first-period incentive constraints might lead to distortions in second-period contracts away from conditionally optimal contracts.
The equilibrium is a separating one only if the discount factor is small (Section 5). The equilibrium probability that the good type pools with the bad type increases with the discount factor and converges to one (without ever reaching this value) when the parties become very patient.
Section 6 analyses the case of a continuum of types. It shows that fully separating the types is feasible but never optimal for the principal.
Our work has general implications for adverse selection models. In particular, we ask if the Hart-Tirole (1988) result according to which the optimal long-term contract between a buyer and a seller yields, for unit demand, the same outcome as Coase's non-commitment durable good model holds when consumption is a continuous variable. The answer is positive if and only if the discount factor is not too high. As a by-product, we compute the multiple-unit two-period monopoly price discriminating allocation (Section 7). The conclusion (Section 8) contains a fairly extensive comparison of the findings with those for the same model when the relationship is organised by a sequence of short term contracts (Laffont-Tirole (1987 The paper does not make predictions as to whether contract renegotiation is likely to be observed. The renegotiation-proofness principle asserts that the principal can restrict attention to contracts that are not renegotiated. On the other hand, the paper shows that an alternative optimal scheme for the principal is to offer a menu of two contracts in period one, that is renegotiated with some probability: a long-term, fixed-price contract (which is not renegotiated), and a short-term contract.
It is often asserted in the procurement context that high-powered incentive schemes (such as a fixed-price contract) are impractical because they are likely to be renegotiated.
Such conventional wisdom should be viewed with caution. High-powered incentive schemes yield efficient production and thus are less subject to renegotiation than lowpowered ones, which are meant to limit the firm's rent. Indeed, comparing commitment to commitment and renegotiation, the threat of renegotiation induces more powerful incentive schemes in the second period! (The effects of renegotiation on the first period are more ambiguous. The good type's incentives go down while the bad type's go up.)
If the conventional wisdom has any merits, these must stem from reasons not captured by our modelling, such as ex post cost uncertainty combined with bankruptcy or political inability for the regulator to commit even to the original contract.
THE MODEL (a) The commitment framework
We consider a two-period model in which a firm (the agent) must, each period, realize a project with a cost structure:
where et is the level of effort exerted by the firm's manager in period t, and 13 is a parameter known only by the manager, which can take two values ,3 and 13, with 13>,3.
Type 13 is called the "good type", and type 13 is the "bad type".
Each period the manager's utility level is U s -4'(e), where s is the net (i.e. in addition to cost) monetary transfer he receives from the regulator and +f(e) is his disutility of effort, where qf,(0) = 0, qf > 0, qif > 0, and, for technical reasons, i.".' 0.3 Let e* denot the socially optimal level of effort, defined by the equality between the marginal disutility of effort and the marginal cost savings: q'(e*) = 1.
The socially optimal cost level is type-contingent and is equal to 3 -e*.
The regulator (the principal) observes cost but not the effort level or the value of the parameter ,3. He has a prior about 13 characterized by v' = prob (13 =13). This probability is common knowledge.
Let S be, each period, the social utility of the project, which can be viewed for simplicity as a public good, i.e. as not sold on the market. The gross payment made by the regulator to the firm is s + c. We assume that there is a distortionary cost A incurred to raise each unit of money (through excise taxes for example).4
Consumers' welfare in period t is S -(1 + A)(st + ct)
LAFFONT & TIROLE ADVERSE SELECTION AND RENEGOTIATION 601 and let 8 be the firm's and the regulator's discount factor. Note that 8 may exceed 1 because it reflects the relative lengths of the accounting periods or the relative importance of the first-and second-period projects.
Under complete information, a utilitarian regulator would solve in each period t max{e,,s,} {S-(1 + Ak)(st + ,8-et ) + st-q iet )} subject to st-iet ) ? 0.
The individual rationality constraint, st -qf(et) 0, says that the utility leve firm's manager must be positive to obtain his participation (the complete information problem being stationary, the allocation is the same at each period).
We assume that S is large enough so that the project is always desirable. The optimal regulatory allocation is then et=e* and st= q(e*), t=1,2.
Welfare is (1 + 8)(S-(1 + A)(4,(e*) +13 -e*))
Because the specific form of the principal's and agent's objective functions is not crucial for our results, from now on we use the general terminology "principal" and "agent" instead of "regulator" and "firm".
We now derive the optimal static incentive scheme under incomplete information.
As is well-known, (Roberts (1983) , Baron and Besanko (1984) ), the optimal two-period incentive scheme under full commitment is the twofold repetition of this optimal static scheme (see Appendix 1) .
From the revelation principle, any incentive scheme is equivalent to a revelation mechanism in which the agent truthfully announces his type and the principal imposes associated values for s and c. The mechanism can therefore be summarized by four numbers (sy, c) (when the agent announces 13) and (s, c) (when the agent announc
The principal faces four constraints: two individual rationality (IR) constraints, guaranteeing that the two types get a non-negative utility in the relationship, and two incentive compatibility (IC) constraints, guaranteeing that the agent does not want to conceal his type. As is usual, only two of these constraints are binding: the bad type's IR constraint and the good type's IC constraint (that the other two constraints are indeed satisfied when they are ignored in the principal's optimization programme can be verified ex post). Note that welfare is expressed in terms of effici E(A U). (The reasoning in this paper aimed at improving on a given contract will either increase efficiency keeping rent constant or possibly increase both efficiency and rent.)
That is, the total cost for a given type is [qf(e)+c], which has shadow cost (1+A), t which must be added the shadow cost of the agent's rent. We thus solve:
The good type's cost is socially optimal: c = 8 -e* (2.7)
However, the bad type's cost is inflated so as to reduce the good type's rent:
We let c(vl) denote the unique solution to equation (2.8). It is easily verified that c(z'l) exceeds the socially optimal cost W3-e* (unless z' = 0), and that it increases with zl'. We implicitly assumed in the previous analysis that the probability of the bad type is not too small; for, above some cut-off level of zl, the principal would choose not to let the bad type produce at all. We will henceforth assume that 1-v' is sufficiently high so that the principal does not elect to ignore the bad type.5
For further reference, we also derive the optimal pooling allocation. To this end, suppose that the principal is constrained to pick a single cost target c for both types (in the commitment case, the principal would never elect to do so; see Proposition 1; but this thought experiment will be useful later, as the solution under renegotiation may involve pooling in the first period). The principal pays a transfer equal to +f(X3 -c) so as to satisfy (2.1). The cost is thus [4' (1-c) 5. The reader may be worried that no such assumption can be made in a dynamic model. Indeed the second-period beliefs v2 might be close to 1 even though the prior beliefs vP are not assumed not to. However, we will show that along the equilibrium path either v2 _ v1 (and then our assumption implies that both types should be kept) or v2 = 1 (and then only the good type is relevant). It can indeed be shown that for any v1 under some cut-off level, the equilibrium is as described in this paper. We now assume that the parties can sign a long-term contract at date 1, but that the principal can at date 2 offer to renegotiate the initial contract. The principal puts prior beliefs PI on the agent's having the good type. The two parties are initially bound by "null contract", which specifies no production and no transfer in either period. At the beginning of period 1, the principal offers a long-term contract {sJ(cl), sA(c1, c2)}.6 contract is called a short-term contract if so is the (second-period) null contract. A observing the agent's performance cl, the principal updates his beliefs to P2 and offers a new second-period contract, that the agent accepts or refuses.7 At any stage, the parties abide by the contract in force if the agent rejects the new contract offer. The old contract is superseded by the new one if the agent accepts the latter. Last, one can restrict the contract offered in period 1 to be renegotiation-proof in period 2, since parties have rational expectations.
RENEGOTIATION-PROOF SECOND-PERIOD CONTRACTS
Suppose that, at the beginning of date two, beliefs are P2 =v. Two cases must be considered, depending on whether the principal wants to keep the bad type in period two.
If the principal does not wish to keep the bad type, then a renegotiation-proof contract specifies the first-best cost of the good type 13 -e* and some level of rent U.
If the principal wishes to keep the bad type, let U0 and U? be the second-period rents of the good and bad types (not including the foregone first-period transfer and disutility of effort) specified by the initial contract binding the parties.
Without loss of generality, we assume that U? =0, by adjusting if necessary the first-period transfers (the reader can check that the analysis below is unaffected if we choose a different normalization).
6. Equivalently, in the two-type case, a long-term contract is the offer of two incentive schemes, A and B, between which the agent selects. Both A and B are of the form {(cl, s,); (C2, ?2), (C-2, S2)}. That is the agent chooses (cl, s,) in period one and then announces his type in period two to pick either (?92, s2) or (c2, s2).
Lemma 1 below shows that there is no gain in having the agent reveal more information in period one than is necessary to determine the first-period allocation (that is, if A and B specified the same (cl, s,) and diff in some first-period announcement by the agent, A and B could be merged in a single incentive scheme at no loss for the principal); and that there is no gain in introducing more than two incentive schemes.
7. Note that we model renegotiation with the uninformed party making the offer. The analysis is more complex if the informed party (here the firm) makes the offer in the renegotiation, as we must worry about the information transmitted by this offer. The difficulty comes from the multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria in the game where the firm makes an offer that the regulator accepts or rejects. However, if we used the notion of strong renegotiation-proofness of Maskin and Tirole (1988) (a contract is strongly renegotiation-proof if it is not renegotiated in any equilibrium of the renegotiation game), we would obtain the same result as here for this different extensive form for renegotiation.
The principal offers a new contract, yielding second-period costs {c, c} and rents { U, U} for the two types so as to solve:
The levels of rent c to (II) involves U rent by the allocations which are the solutions to programme (II) and appropriate transfers.
Note that programme (II) includes only the good type's IC constraint (3.1). As is usual, the ignored IC constraint for the bad type ( U ' U -?(Dc)) is checked ex post. The We obtain the same result as in Proposition 1. The solutions to (I) and (III) coincide except that v' is replaced by v= V2. The allocation is optimal for the principal conditionally on his posterior beliefs. The contract is called conditionally optimal. From Proposition 1, U = qi(#3-c) -qi(I8 -c) = 4(j(p)). This case is therefore valid for U 4(Dz(v)). Actually, for the first-period contract to be renegotiation-proof we must h U0 = (c( v)).
are binding. So, U = U0 and c is defined by V = ?(c). This case ceases to be vali U0 is so large that the incentive constraint (3.4) ceases to be binding, implying Yi = 0; q -L)= 1 or c-=13 -e*, the socially optimal level. Case 2 occurs for U0 between (W(p)) and _(p-e*) giving a cost c between 1-e* and c(v). A contract specifying {c = 8 -e*; 1 -e*-c-v(p); U = ?(c)} is called rent-constrained and is renegotiationproof for U0 = U. The principal would wish to lower the good type's rent, but cannot do so because of the existence of the initial contract. This loss in rent is partially compensated by the fact that the cost of the bad type can be brought closer to the efficient level while still satisfying the good type's incentive constraint. Clearly, in the second period, the principal would prefer a lower value of U0 yielding a conditionally optimal contract. However, this does not mean that the principal is better off committing to the conditionally optimal contract, because the value of U0 affects the first period's incentive constraint.
Finally, Case 3 occurs when U0 lies between 'D(I8 -e*) and 'D(13 -e*),8 (3.5) is binding and (3.4) is not. As observed above, the solution is such that c =83 -e*. So the two cost levels are socially optimal. The cost allocation is identical to that under a sell-out or fixed-price contract, in which the agent is the residual claimant for his cost savings (in the procurement terminology, a fixed-price contract is a contract in which the firm is residual claimant for its cost savings, and thus, in our context, chooses effort e*). It is renegotiation-proof if it corresponds to the rent U0 for the good type. Note that all sell-out contracts have the same efficiency E3 (1 + A )(q,(e*) + , -e*). They differ only by the good type's rent. Therefore, from a second-period view point, the principal prefers the one with the lowest rent.
For further reference we gather our analysis in a proposition and four corollaries.
Proposition 2. Normalizing U = 0, renegotiation-proof contracts that keep both typ in period two can be indexed by a single parameter, the good type's rent U, with U E [ (D F(D8 -e*)]
1. For U = 0(j(z)), it is the conditionally optimal contract: c =,B-e*; c = (v).
For 4(D(v)) < U<4(D e*), it is a rent-constrained contract:
c =8-e*; ,3 e* = (U)=D(v).
3. For D(f -e*)= U-< (/3 -e*), it is a sell-out contract:
c=13-e*; j=p-e*. Corollary 1. In a renegotiation-proof contract, the good type's rent is at least as large as that in a conditionally optimal contract: U ' ? U( v (j(v)).
Corollary 2. The principal's second-period welfare is strictly and continuously decreasing with the (good type's) rent U which indexes the set of renegotiation-proof contracts. The efficiency of the allocation increases with the rent on [4(j(p)), 4(/3 -e*)] (rent-constrained contracts) and does not depend on the rent on [F(D3 -e*), 4(D3 -e*)] (sell-out contracts).
8. Giving up a rent higher than t(,3 -e*) to the good type is impossible because this would violate the bad type's IC constraint. Corollary 4. For any renegotiation-proof contract that is not conditionally optimal, there exists an arbitrary close renegotiation-proof contract with a (slightly) lower rent for the good type, and a (slightly) higher welfare for the principal in period 2.
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE OPTIMAL CONTRACT.
In this section, we partially characterize the optimal contract. Section 5 completes the characterization. Theorem 1. The principal offers the agent a choice between two contracts in the first period. The first is picked by the good type only and yields the efficient cost in both period
In the second contract, both types produce at the same cost level in the first period, and the second-period allocation is the conditionally optimal one given posterior beliefs V2 in [0, vj.
To prove Theorem 1, we first show that the relevant IC constraint in the first period is the good type's. Lemma 1. Without loss of welfare, the principal can offer the agent a choice between two contracts, one chosen by the good type, and the other chosen by the bad type and possibly by the good type.
Proof See Appendix 2. II The ability to commit, despite the renegotiation-proofness condition, enables the principal to neglect the bad type's incentive constraint. The no-commitment analysis provides the intuition for this result. As noted in the introduction, under no-commitment, the bad type's incentive constraint may be binding: the good type must be given a high transfer to reveal information (produce at a low cost) in the first period, which may induce the bad type to mimic the good type in period one and quit the relationship in period two. This take-the-money-and-run strategy can be prevented under commitment and renegotiation, as the agent can commit to produce in period two if he produces at a low cost in period one. Indeed, we will later show that the agent is required to duplicate a low first-period cost in period two.
Interestingly, Lemma 1 and the subsequent analysis still hold when only the principal can commit intertemporally. As is easily seen, the principal can delay transfers so as to ensure that the agent's second-period utility level is non-negative whenever the agent is active.
Lemma 1 implies that the overall optimal contract can be described as in Figure 1,  where the indices of the branches (a1, a2, ... ) refer to the costs requested in the associated contracts. 
The top branch in Figure 1 represents the first contract and is chosen by the good type with probability x. The low and middle branches in period two represent the second contract. The middle branch is chosen by the good type with probability 1 -x. The low branch is always chosen by the bad type.
Let U2 denote the second period rent that the good type is promised if he chooses a, in period 1. From Corollary 2, U2 ?-D(a2) The second-period cost following cost b, is the socially efficient one b2=,3 -e*, it has become common knowledge from the observation of the first-period cost bi the agent has type 13.
The good type must be given a rent in the first contract that is sufficient to induce him not to choose the second contract. The best way to do this is to ask him to produce efficiently, b, = ,3 -e*, and to promise him a total rent:
It remains to determine the optim cost a2 and the optimal x. The determination of the probability x that the good type reveals his type (separates) is tackled in Section 5. For a given x, the principal's welfare is obtained by solving:
Min{ai,a2,u2} {(1 +A)[vIx(f(e*)+ 13-e*)+ v(I -x)(f(A3 -aI)+aI)+(1 -p) Proof The second-period contract must be a rent-constrained contract (including the two extremes in this class). For, if the second-period contract were a sell-out one with rent exceeding F(D3 -e*), the principal could specify a slightly lower rent for the good type while keeping efficiency constant and thus increase welfare (see Corollary 1).
The intuition for the result that second-period contracts are rent-constrained is that any increase of the rent beyond D(a2) serves no purpose in period two and moreover requires (because the incentive constraint of the good type is binding) a further increase of the rent of the good type when he reveals his type.
The optimization programme (4.2) can be broken down in two separate optimizations, minimization of first-period costs with respect to a1, and minimization of second-period costs with respect to a2 subject to (4.3) and (4.4).
To complete the proof of Theorem 1 we consider the second minimization which is rewritten:
,83 -e* -=< a2 P cv2). (4.6) Lemma 3. The optimal a2 equals J((V2).
Proof Consider first the unconstrained minimization. From the Bayesian revision of expectations, v2 < v. The problem is therefore analogous to a one-period static problem with the prior v2. So the optimal solution of the unconstrained problem Z(F"1) is no smaller than c(v2) (from the first-order condition). As the objective function (4.5) is strictly convex in a2, the optimal solution of the constrained problem is j(v2). 11
From Lemma 3, we know that the second-period contract is conditionally optimal given i'2.
Minimization of (4.2) with respect to a1 yields:
Indeed, the optimization problem is here identical to that determining the optimal pooling contract (see (2.9)), but for the fact that only a fraction (1 -x) of the good types produce at cost a1. The two programmes coincide when x = 0. When x = 1, (4.2) coincides with the commitment (separating) programme (program I). Letting a1 = c1(x) denote the solution of (4.7), we obtain immediately:
Theorem 2. The first-period cost in the pooling branch cl(x) is independent of the discount factor (for a given x), and is an increasing function of the probability x that the good type separates in the first period. In a pooling equilibrium (x = 0), cl(0) = cP(vP), and in a separating equilibrium (x = 1), c1(1) = J(PI). Remark 2. The principal's behaviour is equivalent to the offering of a choice between a long-term and a short-term contract. The acceptance of the short-term contract (to produce at the cost target c1(x) in the first period) is followed by the second-period conditionally optimal contract. As we will see in Section 6, the main difference with the no-commitment case is the possibility for the principal to sign a long-term contract with the good type to which the bad type would be committed if he were to sign it.
HOW MUCH POOLING?
This section completes the derivation of the optimal contract by determining the probability x that the good type separates in the first period as a function of the discount factor. The principal's optimization programme over x may not be concave, as we have little information about the curvature of the functions cl(x) and c2(x) e(V2(x)). If the so is not unique, the following properties hold for any optimizing value. For notational simplicity, we will write x(8) as if it were unique. So for instance, "x(8) is non-increasing with 8" means "if x an optimum for 8 and x is an optimum for 8 > 8, then x ' x". (i) The good type's probability of separation x is non-increasing with the discount factor 8.
(ii) There exists 8o> 0 such that for all 8 c 80, the optimal contract is a separating one (x= 1).
(iii) When 8 becomes large (8 -* oo), the optimal contract tends towards a pooling contract (x -* 0). However, a pooling contract is never optimal (x > 0 for all 8).
Thus, when the discount factor increases, the optimal allocation moves from full revelation to full pooling. While full separation is optimal for small discount factors, full pooling is optimal only in the limit of large discount factors. Recall that large discount factors (above 1) need not be absurd, as the discount factor reflects the relative lengths of the accounting periods (or the relative importance of the first-and second-period Consider two discount factors 8 < 8 and let {x, cl = cI(x), c2 = c2(x)} and {, =cl( C2= c2(x)} denote associated optimal allocations. Because renegotiation-proofness depends only on the separating probability and the second-period cost, and not on the discount factor, the principal could have chosen the allocation {I -, I} when facing Second, at 8 = 0, the optimum is the static optimum and thus involves full separation
where use is made of the envelope theorem. Hence W (1, 8, cl(l) , c2 (1)) > W(x, 8, cl(x), c2(x)) for all x close to (but lower than) 1 and all 8 close to 0.
The intuition behind this proof is that if E (=I -x) is the probability of pooling, the first-period loss in welfare due to pooling is proportional to B, while the second-period gain due to a reduction in the good type's rent is proportional to 8E. The intuition here is that at the full pooling allocation, small changes in c2 have only second-order effects because the second-period allocation is the commitment one. A small decrease in c2 allows x to become positive without violating renegotiation-proofness, and the first-period allocation is improved to the first order in x. 11
We can without loss of generality assume that when the principal offers the optimal renegotiation-proof contract (depicted in Figure 2 for the optimal x characterized in Theorem 3), the good type randomizes according to probability x (i.e. the maximal probability that makes the optimal contract renegotiation proof). The reader may wonder how the principal can guarantee that the good type chooses x. Because the good type is indifferent between two contracts, he has no particular incentive to do so. Indeed, for this optimal renegotiation-proof contract, there are other continuation equilibria (the reader will check that any y _ x corresponds to a continuation equilibrium and does not give rise to renegotiation). However we can show that the principal can obtain his maximal payoff without encountering this issue of multiplicity of continuation equilibria following the contract offer. To do so he must offer a contract that is renegotiated (the following argument is similar to one in Fudenberg-Tirole (1988) ). Suppose that in period one the principal offers two contracts: a long-term contract specifying production at cost (,3 in each period and intertemporal transfer [(1+ 8)qi(e*) + 'F(c,(x)) + 8'F(Z(v2(x)))]; a short-term contract specifying production at cost cl(x) and transfer i (,13 -c1(x the first period (and nothing for the second period). First, note that the bad type never chooses the long-term contract, because he would get a strictly negative payoff (even if the contract were renegotiated in period two, as renegotiation never raises the bad type's welfare). Hence the long-term contract is chosen by the good type only, who obtains rent ['F(c1(x)) + 8'6(c(v2(x)))], and is not renegotiated. Let y denote the probability that the good type chooses the long-term contract. Second, if the agent chooses the short-term contract, the principal is not committed in period two and offers the optimal static contract for beliefs v2(Y) characterized in Proposition 1. In particular, the good type's secondperiod rent is F(D(v2(y))), so that his intertemporal rent from choosing the short term contract is ['F(cl(x)) + 8((v2(y)))]. We claim that in equilibrium y = x. For, suppose that y >
x, implying v2(Y) < v2(x). From Proposition 1, c( v(y)) < c(v2(x)). Because '(D*)
is decreasing, the good type's intertemporal rent when choosing the short-term contract strictly exceeds that when choosing the long-term contract. Hence y = 0, a contradiction.
The proof that y < x is impossible is the same. We thus conclude that 1) the equilibrium of the overall game is unique and 2) the principal can obtain his equilibrium payoff by offering a (renegotiated) contract with a unique continuation equilibrium9
Last, it is instructive to consider the case of small uncertainty (A =13 -,13 sm
Under no-commitment (see our 1987 paper), the welfare distortion relative to commitment is of the first-order in AP3 (i.e. proportional to AP3) for the best pooling contract. In contrast, it remains finite (i.e. does not converge to 0 with AP3) for the best separating contract (so that full pooling always dominates full separation for AP small). Under commitment and renegotiation, the welfare loss relative to commitment under both the best full-pooling and the best full-separating contracts (as well as contracts corresponding to intermediate x's) turns out to be of the second order in AP3. To see this, note first that for x = 1 (separating contract), the allocation differs from the commitment one only with respect to the bad type's second-period cost, which is equal to , -e* instead of c(vI). -[(1 +Ak)(1 -vi)(i(e*) + 13 -e*)+ AV1kF((-e*)]}.
But, from (2.8), the difference between c(vI) and (13-e*) is proportional to AP for A,3
small. Furthermore, c( vI) minimizes the commitment cost, so that small variations around c(vI) have only second-order effects. Hence, LS is proportional to (A13)2. The proof that LP--W(0, 8, c (vP), j(vl)) is proportional to (A13)2 as well is similar. It suffices to note that the best pooling contract differs from the commitment 9. The principal can guarantee his maximal payoff through a renegotiation-proof contract without relying on the "right mixing" by the good type if the good type's strategy can be purified. In the spirit of Fudenberg-Tirole (1988) and standard purification arguments, suppose that the agent's preferences are characterized by another private information parameter than /8 and that this second parameter has a continuous distribution. Then under some weak assumptions, the principal can offer a renegotiation-proof contract such that a) the good type (,p) plays a pure strategy (with probability one over his second parameter) and b) the probability of the good type's revealing its 8 converges to x and the principal's payoff converges to that characterized in the text when the second private information parameter converges to a mass point.
allocation only with respect to the first-period cost, which is ,-e* for type ,3 and c(v1) for type A3'0 We conclude that the the best separating contract involve little loss for A,3 small under commitment and renegotiation, contrary to the no-commitment case."
CONTINUUM OF TYPES
We now assume that the agent's type ,3 belongs to an interval [f3, f3], and is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function FQ ) (such that F(f3) =0, F(3) = 1) with continuous density f( ). We make the classic monotone hazard rate assumption: (i) There exist separating (first-period) incentive schemes. The optimal contract in the class of separating schemes yields the commitment allocation in period 1, and the socially efficient cost in period 2.
(ii) A separating contract is never optimal for the principaL Proof. (i) In a separating equilibrium, the agent's type is common knowledge at the beginning of period 2. The possibility of renegotiation implies that the agent's second-period effort is socially optimal: e2(6) = e*. Hence the agent's second-per U2(,3) grows one-for-one with the agent's efficiency: U2(pB) = -1 or U2(f3) -U2(B) = Thus, fixing U2(f3)=O w.l.o.g., both the agent's effort and his rent, and therefore the principal's second-period welfare, are the same in all separating contracts. We call the second-period contract the sell-out contract.
The principal, if constrained to choose a separating contract, thus maximizes his first-period welfare. But, by definition, the welfare-optimal scheme is the commitment scheme. The commitment scheme is computed for a continuous distribution (see Appendix 3 or Laffont-Tirole (1986) ). Under the monotone hazard rate assumption, the agent produces at cost c1() = c*(f3), where c*(f8) ?_ -e* (with strict inequality except at 10. The best pooling contract dominates the pooling contract specifying cl = p -e* for both types. But, because (Pv) -(3 -e*) is proportional to A,l for A,l small, the welfare distortion of this alternative pooling contract relative fo commitment is itself of the second order.
11. The best separating contract dominates the best pooling contract for 8 small, and the converse holds for 8 larger (by the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 3, but restricting the choice of x between two values; 0 and 1).
By construction, this contract yields the commitment welfare in the first period, and the sell-out welfare in the second. The agent's local incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied by construction; checking that the global incentive compatibility constraint holds as well is routine.
(ii) The non-separation result is proved in Appendix 3. The intuition is the following.
In the best separating equilibrium (characterized in (i)), the first-period allocation is the commitment one. That is, it maximizes ex ante welfare subject to the informational constraints. This implies that any change in the first-period allocation has second-order effect. In contrast, the second-period allocation is not optimal from the point of view of the ex ante informational structure. This implies that changes in the corresponding allocation have first-order effects on welfare.
From (i), we know that the only way to change the second-period allocation is to create some pooling in the first period. Our proof shows that, starting from the best separating contract, the principal can force the less efficient types to pool in the first period and thus increase his intertemporal welfare. More precisely, suppose that he penalizes the agent heavily if the latter's cost exceeds c*(,3 -s), where e is positive and small, and that he keeps the same transfers for costs in [c*(p), c*(3-E)] as in the commitment solution. The "bad types", i.e. those in [,3-E, ,3] , now pool at cost c*(l -)-This increases the bad types' efficiency (because cl is brought closer to its efficient level for those types. Recall that c*(l)> ,3 -e*), but increases all types' rent (because U1(,3) = -0'(, -ci(,3)) and Ul(f3) = 0). Overall, the change decreases welfare only to the third order in s: to the second order times the length e over which the change operates. In contrast, in period 2, the pooling of the bad types goes in the right direction from an ex ante point of view. Because the principal offers the conditionally optimal contract given truncated beliefs on [,l3 -, ,l3 ], the cost of each bad type (but type 3 -s) is raised a bit (in a credible way), which moves the allocation in the direction of the commitment solution. The welfare gain is second order in s: first order times the length e over which the change operates. 11
Theorem 4 shows that commitment and renegotiation is intermediate between fullcommitment (for which separation is optimal) and no-commitment (for which separation is not feasible). Here separating contracts exist, but are not optimal.
APPLICATION TO INTERTEMPORAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION.
After substitution of effort e = ,3 -c, our model is one of adverse selection with type , and screening variable c. The conclusions obtained in this paper apply to alternative adverse selection models. An obvious candidate for this transposition is the repeated version of the monopoly price (or quality) discrimination paradigm. Consider the following static two-type model (see, e.g. Maskin-Riley (1984) ). A monopolist produces a good at marginal cost y, and supplies an amount q to a buyer, who derives a surplus V(q, b) from its consumption, where Vq > 0, Vqq < 0, Vb > O, Vqb > 0, Vqqb _ 0. The taste paramet b is private information to the buyer and can take two values: b ("bad type" or "low-valuation buyer") with probability 1-PI and b ("good type" or "high-val buyer") with probability PI. Let q* and q* denote the complete information or optimal consumptions: Vq(q*, b) = Vq(q*, b) = y (with q*> q*).
We now assume that the seller has incomplete information about b. Let ??(q) V(q, b) -V(q, b) with 4"> 0 and V' 0. The monopolist chooses an optimal non-linear price subject to the buyer's IR and IC constraints so as to maximize its profit. In a single-period context, the good type's consumption is socially o bad type's consumption q = q(vl), which is lower than q*, maximizes the social surplus for this type minus the good type's rent: q(vl) = arg maxq {(1 -Pl)( V(q, b) -yq) -vj?(q)}. (7.1) ((7.1) is the analogue of Programme (I) in Section 2.) This price discrimination model is formally identical to ours (b corresponds to minus 13, q to minus c, etc.)12 Hence, we can apply our results to its twice-repeated version.
Assume that the seller leases the good to the buyer in each of two periods. V(*, *) and y are then per-period surplus and marginal cost. (The good can either be a perishable, i.e. one-period lived, good with production cost y, or a good that lasts two periods and costs y(l +8) to produce. In the latter case, to ensure that the second-period opportunity cost is y, one must assume either that there exist overlapping generations of two-period lived consumers and that the firm can price-discriminate between generations or that a one-period lived version can be produced at cost y as well.) The seller offers in period one a long-term leasing contract, which he can offer to renegotiate in period two. The solution will be called the "LT contracting solution" (where LT stands for "long-term", and the possibility of renegotiation under LT contracting is implicit). In the optimal contract, the seller offers the buyer a choice between two consumption levels in period one: q*, which is chosen by the good type only, and is followed by the same consumption in period 2; and ql(x), which is chosen by the bad type and possibly by the good type and is given by the analogue of the maximization of (4.2) with respect to a,:
where (1 -x) is the probability that the good type pools with the bad type. This pooling consumption is followed by the conditionally-optimal price discrimination scheme, yielding consumptions q* and q(v2(x)) to the good and bad types (where VA2(x) pi(' -x)/(pi(' -x) + 1-Vp)). Hart and Tirole (1988) solved this model of long-term leasing with renegotiation in a T-period framework for the case of unit demand (q = 0 or 1).13 A main result of their paper is that the equilibrium LT contract is equivalent to the Coasian durable-good equilibrium. In Coase's durable good model, buyers have unit demands for a perfectly durable good. They differ in their valuations for the good. At each date t, the seller offers a new price Pt for the purchase of the good. Equilibrium is characterized by a decreasing sequence of price offers. The seller screens low-valuation buyers through their willingness to delay their purchase and wait for a lower price. In contrast, in 12 . Consider the following model, which is slightly more general than the one in this paper: (After normalization) the principal has utility W= Y(c,,f3)+t and the,agent U=Z(c,,f3)+t. Assume that Y, YC,B '0; Zc < 0, Z,B < 0, Zcc < 0, Z,C > 0 and Zcco ' 0. The last two inequalities ensure that ?D Z(c, 3) -Z(c, f3) satisfies V'<0, D" ?0. These properties are the only ones used in the paper, and the resu carryfover to this superficially more general model. Now, consider the price discrimination model. The seller (principal)'s utility is W = -yq where T i the price, y the marginal cost of production and q the quantity; the buyer (agent)'s utility is U= V(q, b) -T.
To see that the price discrimination model is a special case of the above model, set c -q, /3 -b, T -t, Y(c, /3)= ye, Z(c, ,3) V(-c, -,3). The five assumptions on V(*, ) made above translate into the five required assumptions on Z(*, *).
13. The unit demand assumption simplifies matters in many respects. First, the socially optimal consumption is not type-contingent (which, for instance, implies that there exists a single sell-out contract instead of a continuum of them). Second, although some continuous consumption choice is introduced into the unit demand model by considering a probability that the buyer consumes in each period the nature of the proof has a simple bang-bang flavour (for instance, the critical beliefs for a socially inefficient contract to be renegotiation-proof in period 2 are independent of the bad type's probability of consumption, while they depend on c2 in our paper). the seller offers buyers long-term leasing contracts that are renegotiated if the concerned buyer and the seller find it mutually advantageous to do so. Yet, the outcome in the rental model under commitment and renegotiation is the same as that in the sale model under no-commitment. One may wonder whether an analogous result holds in the multi-unit case. 14 Before tackling this problem, we make three remarks. First, to of our knowledge, the durable-good model has not yet been studied with multi-unit consumption. Second, if such an equivalence result is to hold, we must consider non-linear pricing in each period in the durable-good model. Third, to make things comparable, we assume that supplying in period 1 a good that lasts for two periods costs (1 + 8)y, i.e.
(1 +8) as much as supplying a single-period-lived product.
It is straightforward to show that the seller cannot obtain more in the durable-good model than under a LT contract. For, in the LT contract framework, the seller can offer the consumption pattern corresponding to the durable-good equilibrium. In period 2, the buyer's consumption pattern is conditionally optimal for the seller (because the durable-good model has no commitment, the seller optimizes in the second period), and is thus renegotiation-proof.15
Conversely, the LT contract outcome can be achieved by the durable-good monopolist subject to the caveat described below. For a central result of our paper (transposed to price discrimination) is that, following the pooling consumption, the seller uses the conditionally optimal price discrimination (see Theorem 1) . So, consider the following strategies in the durable-good model: "In period 1, the seller offers for sale the quantities q,(x), at price V(q,(x), b)(1+8), and 4*, at price V(q*,b)(1+8)-D(q,(x))-86((q(P2(x))) (where x is the equilibrium probability under LT contracting given by (7.2)). In period 2, no further offer is made if the buyer has pur period 1. If the buyer has bought q,(x) in period 1, the seller offers quantit at price V(q*, b)-V(q,(x), b)-D(q(P2(x))), and (q(P2(x))-q,(x)), at price V(q(V2(X)), b) -V(q,(x), b). The low-valuation buyer purchases q,(x) in the fir The high-valuation buyer purchases q* with probability x and ql(x) with pro 1 -x in the first period". Given the first-period sale offers, the seller's and the buyer's behaviour clearly forms a continuation equilibrium of the durable-good game. Furthermore, the first-period sale offers are optimal for the seller because, from our earlier result, the seller's profit in the durable-good model cannot exceed that for the optimal LT contract.
The caveat is apparent in the previous proof. For the equivalence result to hold, the buyer's consumption under LT contracting must be non-decreasing. This amounts to the condition: q1(x) ' q('2(x)). This condition holds for discount factors under some threshold level from Theorem 3.16 For instance, for small discount factors, the equilibrium is separating (x = 1) so that ql(x) = q(vl) < q(v2(x)) = q*. But for discount factors above the threshold level, ql(x) exceeds q(v2(x)), and the durable-good monopolist's profit is strictly lower than the profit under LT contracting (because LT contracting allows decreasing consumption paths).
To summarize our study of the two-period framework, the equivalence between Coasian durable-good dynamics and LT contracting holds as long as the discount factor is lower than some threshold value, i.e. as long as the low-valuation buyer's consumption under long-term contracting is time-increasing. Alternatively, our work can be viewed as 14. We are grateful to Oliver Hart for suggesting this question.
15. This simple reasoning holds only in the two-period model. With more than two periods, a more elaborate argument is needed. See Hart-Tirole (1988) for the unit demand case. 16. Theorem 3 implies that x is a non-increasing function of B. Furthermore, q(v2(x) ) is increasing in x while q,(x) decreases with x. (i) In the first period the buyer chooses between consumptions q* and q,(x) where q* > qj(x). Consumption q*, which is chosen by the high-valuation consumer with probability x, is repeated in period two. With probability (1 -x) , the high-demand consumer pools with the low-demand consumer and consumes q1(x) in period one.
They then consume q* and q(v2(x)) respectively in period two.
(ii) There exists a discount factor So> 0 such that the outcome in the rental m under commitment and renegotiation (characterized in (i)) is the same as that in the sale model under no-commitment if and only if 8 '
COMMITMENT, RENEGOTIATION AND NO-COMMITMENT
In Laffont-Tirole (1987 , we studied the model of this paper under the assumption that the relationship is organised by way of a sequence of two short-run contracts (the no-commitment case). That is, the principal offers a first-period incentive scheme s observes cl, and offers in period 2 the contract S2(C2, C1) that is conditionally optimal given posterior beliefs.17 We view the exploration of commitment and renegotiation and See also the comments below.
(f) "Full separation" means that the principal learns the agent's type at the end of the first period. "Feasibility" refers to the existence of a (not necessarily optimal)
contract that separates the types. "Desirability" refers to the optimal contract.
17. Baron and Besanko (1987) study a different form of limited commitment. The firm promises to produce in period 2 and the principal commits to use in period 2 a mechanism which is "fair", i.e. which leaves to the firm non-negative profits given the information transmitted in period 1. (g) The principal can fully separate the types by offering a sell-out contract from date 1 on (i.e. offering si(c)=s2(c)=(qi(e*)+f3 e*)-c, where , is the upper bound of the interval of types.
The renegotiation case technically resembles the commitment case in that the IC constraints are well-behaved: only the good type's IC constraint is binding. In contrast, under no-commitment, the good type must receive a high first-period reward to reveal his information, because ratcheting makes such revelation costly to him. The bad type may then be tempted to "take-the-money-and-run", i.e. to mimic the good type in the first period, get the high reward and refuse to produce in the second period (this strategy is particularly tempting if 8 is high, because the good type values the future much and therefore must be bribed more to reveal his type). This possibility makes the bad type's IC constraint binding if the discount factor is not too small. The take-the-money-and-run strategy can be prevented under commitment (even with renegotiation) by forcing the agent to repeat his first-period performance if the latter was excellent (i.e. equal to ,3 -e*). In both the renegotiation and no-commitment cases, the first-period contract involves pooling if the discount factor is not too small. Furthermore, the second-period contract is conditionally optimal. In a sense, the main difference between these two cases is the possibility for the principal under commitment and renegotiation to prevent the take-themoney-and-run strategy. This power allows him to give the good type more incentives to separate without having the bad type mimic the good type in the first period. Because the take-the-money-and-run strategy is not optimal for the bad type for small discount factors, it is not surprising that the renegotiation and no-commitment solutions coincide for small discount factors.
An apparent lesson of our three papers and of Figure 3 is that the renegotiation case is somewhat intermediate between the commitment and no-commitment paradigms.
APPENDIX 1
Optimal Scheme under (Full) Commitment
The optimal static commitment solution is characterized in Proposition 1. Suppose that the principal can commit over two periods. A two-period mechanism is a pair of cost-transfer vectors Ml: (c9, s~,) (El, s,) in period 1, and a similar pair in period 2 M2: (C92, s20, (U2, s?2)-Expected social welfare is:
Let M: (c, s) , () denote the optimal static mechanism (M turns out to be deterministic under our assumptions, but the following reasoning carries over to optimal static mechanisms that are stochastic). The associated one-period welfare is:
Note that M repeated twice is an incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism that yields welfare (1 + 8) W in the two-period model. Suppose that W* > (1 + 8) W, and consider the following static stochastic mechanism: M-Ml with probability 1/(1 + 8) and M2 with probability 8/(1 + 8) (so, for instance, when announcing ,3, the firm is instructed to produce at cost cl and receives transfer sl, with probability 1/(1 + 8), and is instructed to produce at cost c2 and receives transfer ?52, with probability 8/(1 + 8)). Mechanism M is incentive compatible and individually rational (because (Ml, M2) is in the dynamic context) and yields expected welfare W*/(1 + 8) > W, which contradicts the optimality of M in the static context.
APPENDIX 2
Proof of Lemma 1
We assume that the principal offers two contracts A and B in the first period (see footnote 6). We shall later
show that the use of more than two contracts does not increase the principal's welfare. The bad type's intertemporal utility may be set equal to zero (if it were equal to a strictly positive number, the principal could uniformly reduce all rents by this number and reach a higher welfare without perturbing any of the IR, IC and RP constraints). Furthermore we can choose the intertemporal structure of transfers to put the bad type's utility equal to zero in each period.
Let a, and b, denote the first-period costs in these two contracts, and a2 and b2 the correspondin type's second-period costs (Proposition 2 implies that the good type's second-period cost in both contracts is /3 -e*). Let A, and A2, and B1 and B2 denote the good type's first-and second-period rents (i.e. the utility levels since the IR levels are normalized at zero) in contracts A and B.
Let x (respectively 1 -x) denote the probability that the good type chooses contract B (respectively A).
Similarly y is the probability that the bad type chooses contract A. We assume that 1 > x, y > 0, so that we have "double randomization".18 Our goal is to show that the principal can do as well with randomization by 18 . We assume that the principal keeps both types in both contracts. As noted in the text, if the principal kept only the good type in period two in contract B, the contract B second-period cost would be the socially optimal one for the good type. The following proof shows that the principal is better off if the bad type ceases to randomize and chooses contract A with probability one (i.e., produces with probability one in period two). one type only or no type at all. The good type randomizes between the two contracts only if he obtains the same intertemporal rent in both:
Al + 8A2 = B1+ 8B2-(A.2) (A.2) will be called the (first-period) incentive compatibility constraint.
Last let Y2 denote the posterior probability that the agent has type / given that first-period cost w (i.e. contract B was chosen). Similarly 92 is the posterior probability following cost a,. (ii) Suppose without loss of generality that A2 = ULA92) and that B specifies a sell-out contract in 2. From Proposition 2, the sell-out contract is renegotiation-proof for any posterior Y2. This implies that we can change the probabilities x and y without perturbing the renegotiation-proofness of contract B. 
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The next question is whether the increase in x maintains renegotiation-proofness. It clearly does for contract B from Corollary 3. It also does for contract A unless A2 = U(it2) (also from Corollary 3). So assume that A2 = U(,t2). A small increase in x requires a slight upward adjustment in A2 (i.e. a slight downward adjustment in a2) to preserve renegotiation-proofness. But this increase in A2 has only a second-order welfare effect, because the initial contract is conditionally optimal. Next, this decrease in a2 requires a small increase in a, to keep (A.5) satisfied. But a, _ cCP(,2) implies that an increase in a, raises first-period welfare (or does not affect it to the first-order).
So we conclude that a slight increase in x, together with small changes in a, and a2 so as to keep (RP) and (A.5) satisfied, strictly increases welfare, a contradiction.
Case 2. First suppose that B2 = U(Y2). Then any small reduction in b2 has a second-order effect on welfare and preserves renegotiation-proofness by Proposition 2. A small increase in b, to keep (A.5) satisfied strictly increases welfare because b, < cP(y2). Hence B2 > U(Y2) (and therefore A2 = VGL2)).
Keeping everything else (costs) constant, let W(x, y) denote the principal's welfare when the randomizing probabilities are x and y. W is linear in x and 9. From Corollary 3, any (x, 9) satisfying V(10 -,A2)(1 -x)l _ ,A2( -PX)y (A.6) yields posterior beliefs /L2: ? /2 in contract A and thus preserves renegoti the (x, y) space, the solution of the maximization of the linear objective fu by (A.6) and over the constraints that and 9 belong to [0, 1] and that B2 on contract B) is a corner solution. Either B2 = U(Y2(-, 9)) and our previo (or both) is equal to 0 or 1, and the double randomization assumption is violated.
We thus conclude that in both cases, maximal welfare can be reached without double randomization.
That is, there exists a renegotiation-proof contract that yields the same intertemporal rent to the good type, and at least as much welfare to the principal, and that involves randomization by at most a single type. Note in passing that this shows also that there is no point considering more than two contracts. With more than two contracts, one can apply the above reasoning to any pair of pooling contracts. Because it is possible to keep the agent's rent constant in the inductive reduction process, this shows that there is at most one pooling contrac The next step in the proof of Lemma 1 consists in showing that randomization by the bad type only cannot be optimal for the principal. Suppose that x = 1 (the case x = 0 is treated identically). Then a2 = p -e* because, following a,, it is common knowledge that the agent's type is 13. Next we compute Ll. Because of el (,8 ) is unchanged for ,3',1-the rent of each type 18? f3-E increases by the same amount as that of type 8 -E (the increase in the rents of types 18 >,8 -e is socially negligible (i.e. of order O(63)) relative to that of types 13 p_ 1-E, because the former types have negligible weight relative to the latter types for E small). The increase in the rent of type E -E is given by:
8U(p-6) = J [it(13 -cc*(#-E)) -c,( c*(1)))]dp ar"(f3-c*(p))(c* (13) 
